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Abstract:  
Recent research on the economic performance of women-controlled firms suggests that 
their underperformance may not result from differences in the managerial ability of 
women as compared to men, but it can be the result of different levels of start-up 
resources. Using accounting data, this paper examines the effects that selected start-up 
conditions have on the economic performance observed in a sample of 4450 Spanish 
manufacturing firms. The results indicate significant differences regarding the initial 
conditions, showing lower levels of assets and number of employees what have 
implications on the economic performance of women-controlled firms. 
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START-UP CONDITIONS AND THE PERFORMANCE OF WOMEN - AND 
MEN - CONTROLLED BUSINESSES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decades, policy makers and academics have generally come to consider 
entrepreneurship as beneficial for the socio-economic development of regions and 
nations mostly because new firms generate employment, bring innovation to market and 
increase industries’ overall productivity through increased competition (van Stel, Carree 
and Thurik, 2007). Although they still represent a minority of all entrepreneurs, women 
around the globe are increasingly well represented among those who set-up and run 
their own businesses (Allen, Langowitz and Minitti, 2007). Women’s entrepreneurship 
has been recently recognised an important untapped source of economic growth (OECD, 
2004) and most governments are designing public initiatives to encourage women’s 
involvement with entrepreneurship. The motivation behind it is quite straightforward: if 
new businesses started by men may produce positive outcomes for a country’s 
economic and social well being, so too may do women’s businesses. Consequently, if 
they are to achieve the desirable outcomes that make entrepreneurship beneficial for the 
society, women’s venture should also pass the survival and growth test. 
 
Yet, the study of women entrepreneurs and their ventures provides some evidence that 
indicate a certain position of disadvantage of women’s venture as compared to those of 
men. Empirical research provides unequivocal evidence that women controlled firms 
(hereafter WCBs
1
) start with lower overall capitalization (Alsos, Isaksen and Ljunggren, 
2006; Marlow and Patton, 2005; Watson, 2002), they establish smaller business-size 
(Cliff, 1998; Rosa, Carter and Hamilton, 1996; Singh, Reynolds and Muhammad, 2001) 
and they are overrepresented in retail and service, industries which are situated at the 
                                                 
1
 No explicitly stated definition for the concept of women-controlled business was found within previous 
literature. However, judging by the criteria chosen by different authors to consider a firm as women-
controlled, two main trends can be identified. On one hand, some studies consider as WCBs those firms 
which have women as owner or main proprietor (Chell and Baines 1998; Fasci and Valdez 1998; Brush 
and Hirisch 2000; Collins – Dodd et al. 2004). Oh the other, WCBs are based on the sex of the first key 
decision maker – such as the CEO or the president of the board of directors - (Du Rietz and Henrekson, 
2000; Watson 2001 and 2002; Watson and Robinson 2003). In this study we define as WCBs those firms 
for which the executive managers are women. We consider this definition as adequate given it reflects the 
real participation of women (as managers) in the day-to-day decision making processes within the firm 
and the business performance outcomes. 
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“ ‘end’ of the value chain” (Brush and Chaganti, 1999: 233) where businesses are 
smaller in terms of employment and returns (Anna et al., 1999).  
 
Intuitively, if WCBs and MCBs systematically differ in terms of chosen industries, 
business scale and funding, they might also show different levels of business 
performance. Previous research, however, has not provided conclusive evidence about 
performance differences between women- and men-controlled businesses. Some 
empirical evidence indicates that WCBs underperform MCBs in terms of sales and 
profitability (Cooper et al., 1994; Rosa et al., 1996; Fasci and Valdez, 1998; Watson, 
2001; Bosma et al., 2004; Cron et al., 2006; Boohene et al., 2008), survival rates 
(Cooper et al., 1994; Carter et al., 1997; Robb, 2002; Bosma et al., 2004) or business 
growth (Cooper et al., 1994; Alsos et al., 2004;). Other studies do not find such 
differences (Chell and Baines, 1998; Watson and Robinson, 2003; Johnsen and 
McMahon, 2005; Coleman 2007) whereas a third group of studies provide evidence that 
supports the female underperformance hypothesis
2
 only partially (DuRietz and 
Henrekson, 2000; Watson, 2002; Collins-Dodd et al., 2004) 
 
Explanations of WCBs’ disadvantage in terms of resources and the way in which they 
may spill over into WCBs’ performance are related to the wider socio-economic and 
cultural context. Carter and Shaw (2006:41) indicate that “[a]s the resources (financial, 
social, human and cultural) required for business ownership are shaped and influenced 
by the wider socio-economic and cultural environment, the structural, societal and 
cultural roles and experiences of women provide a backdrop to, and permeate 
throughout women’s enterprise activities and experiences. Put simply, women’s role as 
business owners reflects their wider position in society. Moreover, as both employees 
and business owners, women’s activities are constrained by a number of economic, 
structural and cultural barriers.” Such barriers refer to gender pay gap, the occupational 
segregation and restricted opportunities for career advancement that women have 
available, and the work-life balance issues. 
 
The persistent pay inequality between men and women – with women being paid lower 
wages than men in the labour market - affects women world around (Kunze, 2008). In 
                                                 
2
 “All else equal, female entrepreneurs tend to be less successful than their male counterparts in terms of 
convencional economic performance measures” (DuRietz and Henrekson, 2000:1) 
 4 
the Spanish context, empirical evidence of the existence of the gender-pay gap is also 
available (de la Rica et al., 2008; García et al., 2001)
3
. Furthermore, the gender pay gap 
increases with the pay scale and the level of education (de la Rica et al., 2008). Garcia et 
al. (2001) provides evidence indicating that whereas the 50% of the best paid men earn 
about 12% more than the 50% best paid women, the wage floor for best paid 10% of 
men is 15% greater than the best paid 10% of women.  
 
One direct consequence of lower wages for women is that they may have less 
opportunities to “accumulate financial capital to start or acquire businesses, other things 
equal” (Boden and Nucci, 2000: 352). There is ample empirical evidence indicating that 
women start their venture with lower levels of financial resources (Cooper et al., 1994; 
Carter et al., 1997; Boden and Nucci, 2000; Alsos et al., 2004). In addition, business 
under-capitalization has been often cited as a primary reason why emerging businesses 
underperform (Marlow and Patton, 2005) or even fail (Chandler and Hanks, 1998). 
 
Traditionally, the gender pay gap was explained within the context of human capital 
theory (Becker, 1985) which argues that individual characteristics like education and 
work experience are accountable for differences in pay. However, the evidence suggests 
that these differences play a minor role in the persistence of the gender pay gap. It 
seems that the gender pay gap is more related to the level of occupational segregation 
and the wage structure (Plantega and Remery, 2006). Research has consistently shown 
that female employment is concentrated in a narrow range of lower-paying occupations 
(Carter and Shaw, 2006). This occupational segregation by sex is persistent in most 
industrialized countries including Spain (see INE (2008) and Polavieja (2008) for recent 
evidence on this matter) and affect women through both horizontal and vertical 
occupational segregation. Whereas horizontal segregation refers to overrepresentation 
of women in some sectors of the economy (such as retail and service), vertical 
segregation refers to the underrepresentation of women in “high-status occupations 
(such as managerial jobs) and their overrepresentation in low-status occupations (such 
as clerical jobs)” (Estévez-Abe, 2006:142). 
 
                                                 
3
 On the average, the wage of Spanish women represents about 70% of that of men (INE, 2008). 
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Horizontal segregation of paid employment explains at least partly women’s choices 
regarding the industries they enter when they switch to entrepreneurship. Women’s 
businesses tend to be concentrated in retail and service industries “where businesses are 
relatively smaller in terms of employment and revenue as opposed to high technology, 
construction and manufacturing.” (Anna et al., 1999:279). Furthermore, having women 
concentrated in such narrow range of occupations (usually what is known as the five 
C’s – caring, cashiering, catering, cleaning and clerical) ensures that women have both 
less work experience and less variety of work experience than men (Carter and Shaw, 
2006), placing women at disadvantage with respect to their human capital. Vertical 
segregation refers to the “invisible artificial barriers, created by attitudinal and 
organizational prejudices which block women from senior executive positions” (Wirth, 
2001:1). There is ample empirical evidence indicating vertical segregation in 
organizations around the world (Oakely, 2000; Terjesen and Singh, 2008). Starting a 
business of their own can be a way for women to come “out from under the glass 
ceiling” (Mattis, 2004) however, vertical segregation also restricts women’s amount of 
management experience and, thus “implies diminished opportunities for women to 
acquire human capital relevant to both the production and managerial components of 
entrepreneurial activities” (Boden and Nucci, 2000:353). 
 
Due to higher flexibility it may provide to women – who still undertake the largest share 
of domestic responsibilities and childcare
4
 – business ownership has long been 
perceived as compatible with women’s role in child-rearing (Winn, 2004). However, 
recent research provides evidence that the issue of balancing work and domestic 
responsibilities can have a negative impact on women’s businesses (Bock, 2004). Based 
on relevant literature they review, Carter and Shaw (2006) point out several ways in 
which the work-life balance issues may affect WCBs. Firstly, more women than men 
choose to start their businesses at home in order to accommodate both domestic 
responsibilities and work. Operating a business from home may affect the legitimacy of 
the business in the eyes of stakeholders such as creditors, thus affecting women’s access 
to finance. Second, the need to schedule business activities around childcare may limit 
the time women invest in their business and may create a role conflict for women, 
                                                 
4
 Studies on the Spanish context indicate that Spanish women are responsible for the most part of 
housework (Instituto de la Mujer, 2007; Polavieja, 2008). On the average, women living in partnership 
report doing more than three quarters of all the housework whereas nearly 70% of all employed married 
and cohabiting Spanish men admit doing less than one quarter of it (Polavieja, 2008: 208). 
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which can result stressful. Hence, such work-life balance issues may also limit the 
initial resources women can acquire and invest and negatively influence the consequent 
performance of their businesses. 
 
It has been long acknowledged by research in entrepreneurship that initial endowments 
impact how firms evolve. As pointed out by Kimberly (1979:438) “just as for a child, 
the conditions under which an organization is born and the course of its development in 
infancy have nontrivial consequences for its later life”. Cooper et al (1994:372) also 
indicate that initial resource endowments affect organizations’ “strategies, which in turn 
bear upon the capabilities developed in the young firm. Later competitive positions may 
be path-dependent, with firms that were unable to pursue desirable early strategies, later 
finding themselves unable to match those that could”. Hence, if women found 
businesses which are systematically smaller than those of men’s and employ less 
financial capital; one might expect lower levels of financial performance of WCBs 
during the subsequent development of their firms.  
 
This paper seeks to provide further empirical evidence regarding the performance of 
women-controlled businesses by examining the impact that initial resource endowments 
– such as initial size and financial capital – have upon the early performance of their 
firms as compared with the performance observed in men-controlled firms. The 
empirical application considers combinations of resources of a material nature, rather 
than education, work experience, entrepreneurial skills or managerial abilities of the 
women and men that started up the ventures included in the sample. This is due to 
reasoning found in previous research which suggests, as mentioned above, that women-
controlled firms generally underperform men-controlled firms because women tend to 
establish ventures in less profitable industries and they start-up their firms on a smaller 
scale and with lower endowments of capital than men do. In other words, the paper 
starts from the assumption that women and men are equally able as entrepreneurs but 
differences in the amount of material resources employed at start-up affect the 
performance of their firms in the early years. The analysis of underlying factors – i.e. 
socio-cultural conditions - that produce such differences in the amount of resources that 
men and women entrepreneurs are able to rise and employ at start-up goes beyond the 
scope of the study and is not examined. 
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The reminder of this paper is organised as follows. In the following section we present a 
review of relevant literature and the hypotheses to be tested. In the third section, 
methodological issues such as data and the empirical model are presented followed by a 
presentation and discussion of empirical results in the forth section. In the final section, 
conclusions and limitations of the study are provided as well as implications for future 
research. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HIPOTHESES  
With some notable exceptions, the impact of initial endowments on the performance of 
WCBs has been understudied. Rather, we can observe a larger number of papers that 
examine and compare the performance of WCBs and MCBs at post start-up moments. 
Both types of research show two common features: firstly, they employ a variety of 
performance measures and, secondly, they provide mixed evidence regarding WCBs’ 
performance. 
 
A summary of the research examining the impact of start-up condition on the 
performance of WCBs and MCBs is presented in Table 1a.  
 
[Insert Table 1a about here] 
 
Some of the studies that examine the impact of initial endowments on performance 
(Cooper et al., 1994; Carter et al, 1997; Boden and Nucci, 2000 and Bosma et al., 2004) 
measure performance as the firm ability to survive. Cooper et al. (1994) finds WCBs just 
as likely to survive as MCBs but less likely to grow due to lower initial resource 
endowments. Carter et al. (1997) use the flip side of business survival as measure of 
performance and finds higher odds of failure for WCBs. However, although this study 
found certain resource deficiencies in the case of WCBs (smaller scale and less 
instrumental experience from working in retail) such resource deficiencies did not 
appeared as affecting the odds of WCBs to fail as much as they did MCBs. Bosma et al. 
(2004) use two performance measures additional to firm survival: the profit made by 
firms and the cumulated employment during the period of study. The study found 
significant positive relationship between founders’ education; their previous experience 
as employer and their experience in business. However, as gender is used as control 
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measure, no additional discussion is provided on how the initial human and social 
capital affects the performance of WCBs. 
 
Finally, Alsos et al. (2004) tackle the question of business growth in WCBs in 
relationship with the initial capital available for start-up. The study indicates that WCBs 
raise lower levels of capital both at start-up and 19 months after and reports a strong 
association between the amount of capital raised at start-up and the sales turnover 19 
months after. However, after the amount of capital at start-up is controlled for, no 
significant differences between WCBs and MCBs’ business growth was found. 
 
Whereas the question of how initial endowments affect the performance is relatively 
understudied, there are a large number of papers that examine and compare the 
performance of WCBs with that of MCBs at post start-up moments. A brief review of 
studies that test the female underperformance hypothesis is presented in Table 1b. 
Whereas some studies provide evidence WCBs underperform MCBs (Rosa et al., 1996; 
Fasci and Valdez, 1998; Watson, 2001; Cron et al., 2007; Boohene et al., 2008) others 
do not report performance differentials based on entrepreneurs’ gender (Chell and 
Baines, 1998; Watson and Robinson, 2003; Johnsen and McMahon, 2005; Coleman, 
2007). In addition, some research papers find only partial support for the female 
underperformance hypothesis, which is supported for some but not all of the 
performance measures used (DuRietz and Henrekson, 2000; Watson, 2002; Collins-
Dodd et al., 2004).  
 
[Insert Table 1b about here] 
 
The empirical evidence summarized in Table 1b indicate a consensus among the 
different research studies regarding the fact that WCBs are generally smaller than MCBs 
in term of their number of employees (Rosa et al., 1996; DuRietz and Henrekson, 2000; 
Watson and Robinson 2003; Coleman, 2007); total assets (Rosa et al., 1996; Coleman, 
2007) or sales (Rosa et al., 1996; Collins-Dodd et al., 2004; Alsos et al., 2006; Coleman, 
2007). Regarding the growth dimension of business performance, Johnsen and 
McMahon (2005) finds no differences between WCBs and MCBs pace of growth 
whereas Coleman (2007) finds WCBs as growing at a faster pace. 
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Some studies also indicate that firms controlled by women are less profitable than those 
controlled by men (Fasci and Valdez, 1998; Watson, 2001 and 2002; Collins-Dodd et 
al., 2004). Nonetheless, other studies find no significant differences with respect to all 
or some of the profitability measures employed (DuRietz and Henrekson, 2000; Johnsen 
and McMahon, 2005). It appears therefore that there are some conflicting results from 
previous research on differential performance between WCBs and MCBs. The relatively 
small samples they analyse
5
 (cross-sectional data almost exclusively) and their limited 
geographic coverage (usually Anglo-Saxon countries) make it difficult to generalize 
from their findings. Furthermore, they are limited to sectors where women are 
overrepresented such as retail and services while little is known about the performance 
of WCBs in less traditional sectors such as manufacturing or construction. Precisely, the 
contribution of this study is that it is based on a large sample of Spanish firms, in the 
manufacturing industry, just the less explored situation of the existent empirical 
research in the field. 
 
Overall, previous research indicates that women start their ventures with lower initial 
endowments. In this study we hypothesise that this disadvantage at start-up leads to 
lower levels of business performance during consequent development of their firms. 
Hence, we state the following two hypotheses: 
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between start up size and firm’s 
future performance. 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between financial capital and firm’s 
future performance. 
 
Concerning the size, there is evidence suggesting gender differences among women and 
men entrepreneurs regarding the ideal-sized firm they desire (Cliff, 1998). Accordingly 
women entrepreneurs tend to establish a maximum business-size threshold for their 
firms, usually smaller than that established by men, beyond which they prefer not to 
expand. Furthermore, women entrepreneurs tend to be more concerned than men about 
the risks associated with fast-paced business growth and “deliberately strive to expand 
in a controlled and manageable manner” (Cliff, 1998: 538). Hence, if business size at 
                                                 
5
 Exception to this are the Australian studies – Watson (2001, 2002, 2003) and Johnsen and McMahon 
(2005), all using the same data base; DuRietz and Henrekson’s (2000) study of Swedish entrepreneurs, 
and Robb’s (2002) study on US firms. 
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start-up positively influences firm’s future performance this effect might be lower in the 
case of women-controlled firms as their size tends to be smaller as compared with men-
controlled firms.  
 
Other possible explanation of performance differences between WCBs and MCBs 
regards the relationship between business size and women’s access to capital. Several 
studies provided evidence that women’s businesses grow less than men’s and assert that 
this difference is due to the “substantial funding gap that limits women’s opportunities 
to grow their ventures” (Brush et. al, 2002:1, cited in Alsos et. al, 2006:680). Although 
this study does not explore directly the issue of whether women face more stringent 
requirements from banks to obtain loans, the results indicate that women startup with 
significantly lower levels of assets and long term debt which could also be an indication 
of less access to funding for WCBs. If the firm’s financial capital is expected to 
positively affect its future performance and if women-controlled firms tend to invest 
less financial capital in their businesses, this might explain eventual performance 
differences between WCBs and MCBs. These considerations led us to define the 
following hypotheses subsequent to H1 and H2, respectivelly. 
 
H1a: The relationship between start up size and firm’s future 
performance is stronger for MCBs than for WCBs. 
 
H2a: The relationship between financial capital and firm’s future 
performance is stronger for MCBs than for WCBs. 
 
3. DATA AND METHOD 
3.1. Data 
The dataset used in this study was collected from the Sistema de Análisis de Balances 
Ibéricos (SABI) database for the period 2000–2005. The SABI database contains 
financial information for more than 500,000 Spanish and Portuguese firms. Given the 
purpose of this study, we collected yearly information on Spanish firms from 12 
manufacturing industries which started-up as small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
between years 2000 and 2004 and did not ceased their activity during the mentioned 
period. That is, the oldest firms included in the sample have five years of age whereas 
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the youngest are one year old. The application of these criteria yielded a final dataset of 
4,450 firms of which 533 are women-controlled
6
. 
 
The industry configuration by gender for each sector considered in the sample is 
presented in Table 2. Five out of twelve sectors pertain to the food and beverages 
industry while the remaining belong to pharmaceutical industry; manufacture of electric 
and electronic equipment and machinery; manufacture of basic metals and structural 
metal products. Regarding the sex distribution of firms along these sectors, it can be 
observed that WCBs’ presence predominates in manufacture of machinery and 
equipment; manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus and, in all food and 
beverage industries excepting the manufacture of vegetable oil and fats. Conversely, 
MCBs prevail in pharmaceutical industry; office machinery and computers manufacture; 
manufacturing of radio, television and communication equipment and manufacturing of 
structural metal products. 
 
[Insert Table 2 bout here] 
 
Loscocco and Robinson (1991) categorize the manufacturing industries as male-typed 
whereas the retail and service industries are considered as female-typed. Given all firms 
in our sample belong to manufacturing industries; we use the OECD’s industry 
classification according the degree of technological implementation (Hatzichronoglou, 
1997) to check for the existence of possible patterns, if any, regarding women’s 
preferences when launching new ventures in male-typed industries. For each industry 
the proportion of firms relative to the total number of firms for the period under analysis 
(2000-2005) was calculated. It can be observed that most of firms in the total sample 
belong to sectors of medium degree of technological implementation (79,58%). 
Regarding the gender distribution, more MCBs than WCBs are present in sectors of high 
degree of technological implementation (5,72% of all MCBs versus 4,24% of all WCBs). 
In the case of firms belonging to sectors with a lower degree of technological 
implementation, these are predominantly women-controlled (18,52% of all WCBs 
                                                 
6
 According to the demographic statistics provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (www.ine.es), 
between 2000 and 2004 the total number of firms created in the aforementioned sectors was 42,170. 
Taking into account the survival rates of industrial firms (54.66 % of firms created survive after the fourth 
year; see Cámaras de Comercio, Industria y Navegación, 2001), the estimated surviving firms are 23,050. 
This means that our sample of 4,450 firms represents almost the 20 % of the surviving firms generated in 
the Spanish industrial sectors under consideration.  
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versus 14,36% of all MCBs). Although these results suggest a certain pattern of 
behaviour for WCBs within manufacturing industries these results should be interpreted 
with caution and can be addressed by further research. 
 
Table 3 presents yearly start-ups by the sex of the manager and aggregate descriptives 
of start-ups’ characteristics. Information presented in the table is consistent with 
findings in previous research. It can be observed that the yearly number of start-ups is 
up to nine times bigger for MCBs as compared to WCBs. Furthermore, newly born firms 
controlled by women are established at a smaller scale (WCBs show up to 3 times less 
assets). No significant differences in size were found between WCBs and MCBs, when 
size is measured through the total number of employees. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
New firms controlled by men score higher on initial endowments of financial resources 
their initial debt (measured through the amount of contracted long-term debt) being 
significantly bigger (MCBs show up to 5 times larger long term debt than WCBs). 
Similarly, the financial cost (measured through the interest paid for the contracted long-
term debt) is up to 4.4 times higher in the case of MCBs.    
 
3.2. Performance variables 
Two aspects of business performance are considered, namely business growth and risk-
adjusted profitability. We could have chosen more ‘subjective’ indicators of 
performance such as, for instance, the extent to which the firm and/or the entrepreneur 
has achieved the objectives set (Reid and Smith, 2000). Some authors argue that men 
and women may perceive and measure business performance differently and therefore, a 
relativist approach to performance would fit better to this stream of research. It was 
argued within previous research that women may be less concerned with financial 
rewards than men are (Watson, 2001) and are more interested in pursuing intrinsic goals 
as, for example, independence or to balance work and family responsibilities 
(DeMartino and Barbato, 2003). Consequently, it was considered that women assess 
their success in business in relation to their achievement in attaining personal goals (e.g., 
goal attainment, self-fulfilment), while men are assumed to assess success using 
quantitative criteria (e.g., profit, growth) (Carter et al, 2001). Therefore, if women think 
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success and performance in different terms than men do, then they will also differ in the 
performance levels they seek and achieve. However, previous research on this matter 
provides “a generally conclusive [empirical evidence indicating] that men and women 
tend to use the same criteria for business performance, which is often a combination of 
firm-based criteria (sales turnover, profitability, etc) and personal criteria (fulfilment, 
ambition etc)” (Carter and Shaw, 2006: 69). 
 
Some empirical comparisons of WCBs and MCBs’ performance that found little or no 
differences in terms of profitability, found bigger differences in terms of growth related 
measures (Cooper et al., 1994; DuRietz and Henrekson, 2000). Such situation can be 
explained through findings of research on growth aspirations of women business owners 
which posits that “growth orientation is a complex phenomenon that may well be 
influenced by gender” (Morris et. al, 2006: 239), and provides empirical evidence that 
suggests a lower propensity toward growth among women (Rosa et. al, 1996 and 
Menzies et al., 2004) as well as a tendency of women to set lower business thresholds 
beyond which they prefer not to expand (Cliff, 1998). Business growth appears 
therefore as a differencing characteristic among WCBs and MCBs. Yet, very few studies 
examine business growth in particular (Johnsen and McMahon, 2005) probably due to 
the shortage of longitudinal data (DuRietz and Henrekson, 2000).   
 
From an operational point of view, and similar to Watson and Robinson (2003), we first 
measure performance as the Sharpe’s (1975) reward-to-variability ratio. This variable 
was originally developed to evaluate the performance of securities and investment 
portfolios, and it is defined as the ratio of a profit measure (reward) divided by the 
standard deviation observed for those profits (variability). The importance of controlling 
for risk when assessing the performance of male and female SMEs becomes more 
evident as it has been showed by empirical evidence that women tend to have higher 
levels of risk aversion as women are more reluctant both to assume the burden of 
business debt and engage in fast-paced business growth (Carter and Shaw, 2006: 63). 
This way, the Sharpe ratio not only provides an risk-adjusted picture of performance 
that could facilitate the evaluation of SME’s performance, but its use is further justified 
given the potentially dissimilar objective functions of male and female business 
managers, where the attitude towards risk-taking behaviour seems to play a key role. 
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In our context, the Sharpe ratio is measured as the ratio of net profits divided by its 
standard deviation. At this point two important considerations are also in order. First, 
we consider net profits as a reward because it represents the monetary outcome earned 
by ventures, and for market-driven managers profit constitutes a major component of 
the performance construct (Taggard, 1996; Watson and Robinson, 2003). Second, our 
approach to the Sharpe ratio implies the calculation of annual values for this variable to 
control for time variations. Also, and given the need to control for differences at the 
industry level in what concerns the variability of risk, we estimated the Sharpe ratio for 
each sector in our sample in a separate fashion. From Table 4 it can be observed that, in 
our sample, risk-adjusted performance of WCBs is significantly lower (3.49%) relative 
to that shown by their male counterparts (8.38%). 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Regarding the second dimension of economic performance (business growth), this was 
measured using two variables namely the yearly variations in total sales and, the yearly 
variations in the number of employees. Sales and employment growth are considered as 
desirable outcomes of successful entrepreneurial firms and are frequently employed as 
valid indicators of firm growth in performance comparisons between WCBs and MCBs. 
Therefore, the growth measures used within this study are defined as the annual 
logarithmic change in sales volume and the number of employees. From the descriptives 
we observe that, between 2000 and 2005, the average annual rate of sales growth of 
MCBs (45.20%) is significantly higher than that reported for WCBs (39.70%). A similar 
pictures emerges when comparing the annual employment growth between MCBs 
(21.24%) and WCBs (19.25%), however, for this variables differences in employment 
growth are not statistically significant (Table 4). 
 
3.3. Empirical method 
Multivariate analysis was used to examine the differential effects that firm size and 
financial resources are having upon business performance. Concerning the econometric 
approach, panel data analysis is the most efficient tool when the sample is a mixture of 
time series and cross-sectional data, since this structure allows for taking into 
consideration the unobservable and constant heterogeneity, i.e., the specific 
characteristics of each firm. As a result, a fixed-effects model appears as the most 
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suitable methodological tool. To justify the use of the econometric approach chosen, we 
carried out the Hausman (1978) specification test. As we indicate below in section 4, 
results for this test further corroborate the appropriateness of the fixed-effects parameter 
estimates.  
 
Business performance is assumed to be a function of a set of independent variables 
where the constraints faced by recently created firms (e.g. undercapitalization, 
smallness) play an important role. To test for the existence of the differential impact of 
such constraints on the performance of the firms in our sample we propose the 
following regression: 
2
, 0 1 , 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1
5 , 1 6 , 1
7 , 8 , ,
Performance Firm Age Size Size Leverage
                       Long Term Debt Financial Cost
                       Time Time Industry
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t
i t i t i t i
β β β β β
β β
β β η
− − −
− −
= + + + + +
+ + +
+ + × + + ,i tε
[1] 
 
Where 1,...,i N= and 1,...,t T= represent the cross-sectional units and the time periods, 
respectively, iη  is the unobserved fixed firm-specific effect, and ,i tε  is the stochastic 
error term varying cross-time and cross-unit. Equation [1] was estimated for the sub-
sample of WCBs and MCBs separately, and in terms of our hypotheses we expect 
that 2 0β > and 3 0β > (H1), being this effect greater for MCBs 
( )1a 2 2 3 3H :  and MCB WCB MCB WCBβ β β β> > . Also, we expect a positive relationship 
between financial resources and performance( )2 4 5 6H : 0, 0 and 0β β β> > > , and 
finally we expect that 4 4
MCB WCBβ β> , 5 5
MCB WCBβ β>  and 6 6
MCB WCBβ β> , indicating that 
these financial variables have a greater impact on performance in the case of the group 
of MCBs (H2a).  
 
However, we are aware that the mere comparison of parameter estimates obtained from 
the estimation of the model presented in equation [1] does not allow us confirming that 
size and access to finance exert a differential effect on WCBs and MCBs when it comes 
to future performance. In order to corroborate our hypotheses, it is necessary to test for 
the presence of parameter heterogeneity across the groups of firms under analysis, that 
is, WCBs and MCBs. Thus, we use the Chow test (1960). This procedure is especially 
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useful for the purposes of this paper, as it examines whether parameter estimates 
obtained for one group of the data equal those obtained for another group of the data 
(Greene, 2003). This test has been commonly used to validate data pooling in statistical 
analysis, however, in our case the Chow test represents the econometric test that best 
fits to our attempt of determining the extent to which size and access to financial 
resources affect performance, and whether size and access to finance exert a differential 
impact on performance between WCBs and MCBs. To ensure the robustness of the 
results, we run the Chow test for each of the variables related to size and financial 
resources. 
 
Concerning the set of independent variables, we introduce the size of the firm, measured 
through total assets when the dependent variable is the Sharpe ratio, and the number of 
employees, when the dependent variable is employment growth; and sales volume, 
when the dependent variable is sales growth. The variables related to financial resources 
include the long term debt (used as proxy for financial capital), the financial costs 
(measured as interest paid for long-term debt), and the financial leverage ratio 
(measured as the ratio of debt to equity) to proxy the financial structure of the firm
7
. 
Two additional control variables are considered: time dummies; and an interaction term 
between time and industry to control for the differential effect that industry sectors may 
have on our performance measures.  
 
Table 5 presents the descriptives for the independent variables used in this study. As 
expected, and consistent with previous research, WCBs show lower levels of resource 
endowments than MCBs. On average, WCBs are significantly smaller than MCBs being 
more than four times as large as women-controlled firms as determined by total assets. 
Regarding the second measure of size, it can be observed that, on the average, the 
number of employees in MCBs represents almost one and a half of the workforce 
employed by WCBs. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
                                                 
7
 The size of the business and its financial capital are considered initial resources in the start-up year and 
inputs in the subsequent years and are expected to behave according to the hypotheses stated above. 
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Concerning the use of financial capital, MCBs show, on the average, nine times more 
long term debt than WCBs and, consequently they incur in significantly higher financial 
costs (the interests paid by MCBs for the long-term debt are nearly six times bigger than 
those paid by WCBs). In addition, the average values obtained for leverage ratio (debt-
to-equity) indicate that WCBs show a more balanced capital structure as compared to 
MCBs (8.62 versus 11.10). 
 
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This section presents the empirical findings. Regression results are presented in Tables 
6 to 8 and are commented below. In all the Tables, specification 1 only considers firm 
age, size terms and leverage as independent variables. Model 2 takes in account the long 
term debt whereas Model 3 introduces the financial costs into the analysis.  
 
As we mentioned in the previous section, we decided to use a fixed-effects approach for 
our estimations. However, this decision is critical in any analysis since the random and 
fixed effects models may produce different results (Greene, 2003). A fixed effects 
model produces consistent parameter estimates in the presence of random or fixed 
individual effects. To corroborate the consistency of our estimations, we estimated the 
Hausman specification test for all our models (Hausman, 1978). Results for this test are 
presented, for each model, in Tables 6 to 8, and in all cases the hypothesis of similarity 
of the coefficients in the fixed and random effects models can be rejected. This means 
that parameter estimates obtained from the fixed-effects model are more efficient 
(smaller asymptotic variance), and that the error terms are correlated with the 
explanatory variables, so therefore, the nature of the individual effect is fixed. 
 
However, as we ran two separate regressions for WCBs and MCBs, a critical question 
rising is to whether size and access to financial resources are equally affecting 
performance in WCBs and MCBs. To address this question we performed the Chow test 
and the results are presented in Table 10. 
 
Regression results obtained for each dependent variable (sales and employment growth, 
as well as the Sharpe ratio), reveal interesting findings regarding the relationship 
between firm-size and economic performance. Arguably, the sign in the parameter 
estimates suggest that this relationship is U-Shaped for men-controlled businesses 
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(Specifications 1 to 3 for MCBs in Tables 6 to 8). To the contrary, our findings show 
that for women-controlled businesses the size-growth relationship is negative when 
business growth is the performance measure (Specifications 1 to 3 for WCBs in Tables 6 
and 7). 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
This negative relationship between business size and growth, measured both in terms of 
number of employees and sales volume, indicates that smaller firms controlled by 
women tend to grow faster than larger ones. These results are in accordance with 
previous research findings reporting different growth orientations for WCBs (e.g. 
Cooper et. al, 1994; Cliff, 1998; Menzies et. al, 2004). This could indicate that women, 
as managers, are more concerned by the risk attached to fast-growing behaviour, which 
can be interpreted as a signal of their lower growth propensity (Cliff, 1998). 
Furthermore, the different shape of the relationship growth–business size between 
WCBs and MCBs signals that women-controlled businesses grow at a decreasing rate, 
whereas larger firms controlled by men may benefit from economies of scale and thus, 
exhibit positive variations in employment and sales.  
 
Concerning the risk-adjusted profitability measure (Sharpe ratio in Table 8), our results 
show that women-controlled businesses’ performance is not conditioned by size, 
whereas for men-controlled businesses we find the same U-shaped relationship pattern. 
These results indicate that smaller men-controlled firms show negative risk-adjusted 
performance rates, but beyond a crucial threshold, larger firms controlled by men 
exhibit an upward trend of performance.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Regarding the effects that the selected finance-related variables – long term debt, 
financial costs and leverage – have on performance, the results show similar patterns 
when performance is measured as business growth (variations in sales and employment), 
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whereas the results obtained for the risk-adjusted profitability measure (Sharpe ratio), 
are slightly different. 
 
Regression results in Tables 6 and 7 indicate that financial resources employed – 
measured as long-term debt – and, the financial cost associated to debt exert a positive 
and highly significant impact of firm growth for both WCBs and MCBs. In other words, 
both WCBs as MCBs use debt to expand their businesses. These findings contradict 
results provided by previous research suggesting that, rather than seeking immediate 
expansion, women use finance in start-up years to purposes more linked to survival and 
business consolidation (Coleman, 2007). However, when risk is accounted for when 
measuring performance (Sharpe ratio, Table 8), none of these two variables appear as 
affecting the profitability of WCBs. Nonetheless, our results reveal that financial costs 
linked to debt boost economic performance in the case of MCBs.  
 
Regarding the results for the variable related to the debt-structure (leverage)
8
, this has 
no impact on firm growth irrespective of the sex of the manager. However, when 
performance is defined as the Sharpe ratio (Table 8), we find that leverage (debt-
structure) has a negative and statistically significant effect on women-businesses’ 
performance. This could only indicate that women who decide to bias their sources of 
finance to long-term debt exhibit lower levels of performance, as compared to their 
male counterparts.  
 
This latter result, together with those reported for the impact of long-term debt and 
financial cost on business growth, could indicate that men-controlled businesses benefit 
more from debt to grow and increase performance, relative to women-controlled 
businesses, because either suppliers of finance favour larger firms (Orser and Foster, 
1994) or women are subject to different lending policies by borrowers (Coleman, 2000 
and Orser, et al., 2006). Consequently, we test for potential differences in the mean 
interest rate (financial cost divided by debt) charged to women and men controlled 
businesses (Table 9). Nevertheless, we find no statistically significant differences in the 
mean interest rates of women and men businesses. Hence, we cannot support the 
lending-bias argument to explain both the negative effect that our leverage variable 
                                                 
8
 We gratefully thank one of the anonymous reviewers for clarifications given upon this issue. 
 20 
exerts on women-controlled businesses’ performance, and the highly significant 
positive effect that debt and financial cost have on growth and risk-adjusted 
performance showed by men-controlled firms. 
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
To summarize, our findings indicate that, in the manufacturing industries considered in 
the sample, women- and men-controlled firms show significant differences regarding 
their initial conditions. WCBs consistently show lower levels of assets and number of 
employees, contract lower amounts of long-term debt and therefore incur less financial 
costs. Also, at this point our results suggest that there exist differences in the impact of 
size and financial-related variables when comparing the performance of WCBs and 
MCBs. Therefore, now we proceed to corroborate how significant are these differences 
through the Chow test. As we indicated above, through this test we compare the 
parameter estimates of WCBs and MCBs for each of the variables of interest throughout 
the different model specifications presented in Tables 6 to 8, and results for the Chow 
test are presented in Table 10. 
 
Regarding the effect of size on firm performance, our empirical findings provide partial 
support to the first set of hypotheses. Irrespective of the performance variable chosen, 
for our sample of Spanish manufacturing firms, business size has a non-linear effect on 
MCBs’ performance both in terms of business growth (sales and employment) and in 
terms of profitability (Sharpe ratio). When comparing the parameter estimates for the 
size variables between WCBs and MCBs we observe that these coefficients are 
significantly different only when business growth (employment and sales) is the 
performance measure ( )2 2 3 3 and MCB WCB MCB WCBβ β β β< > . However, we failed in 
finding differences in the parameters related to the size variables when the Sharpe ratio 
is the dependent variable (Table 10). These results could indicate that larger firms 
controlled by men may obtain important gains from economies of scale and show 
increasing rates of performance. This condition does not hold for women-controlled 
firms. The results are similar with those obtained by some previous research (e.g. 
Watson and Robinson, 2003) and indicate that although women-controlled firms are 
smaller (due probably to the amount of resources they employ at start-up) women are as 
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effective as men irrespective of the size of their firms and the risk they bear (provided 
performance is measured controlling for risk).  
 
Consequently, we partially confirm hypothesis H1 only for men-controlled firms, and 
we confirm hypothesis H1a which proposed that the effect of size on performance is 
greater in MCBs.  
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
As for the financial structure of the firm, our results indicate that, irrespective of the sex 
of the manager, firms with a strong preference for debt as main source of financial 
recourses, as compared to equity, do not exhibit higher growth rates (employment and 
sales). To the contrary, we observe that the coefficient associated to leverage for the 
sub-sample of WCBs is significantly lower than that reported for the group of 
MCBs( )4 4MCB WCBβ β>  (Chow test: 5.64 and significant at the 5% level), confirming 
that a financial structure more biased towards equity exerts a negative impact on the 
performance of WCBs when the Sharpe ratio is the dependent variable.  
 
Finally, we find that, for both WCBs and MCBs, financial capital (long-term debt and 
financial cost) is positively related to business growth. In this case, the coefficients 
obtained for the sub-samples of WCBs and MCBs are not significantly different, 
indicating that the positive effect that financial capital is having upon business 
expansion is homogenous in our sample (Table 10). Nevertheless, a different picture 
emerges when examining the results when performance is measured through the Sharpe 
ratio. In this case, we observe that the only statistically significant difference comes out 
when comparing the coefficients for financial cost( )6 6MCB WCBβ β>  (Chow test: 2.23 
and significant at the 10% level). This result could reflect that, on the one hand, male 
managers have a greater incentive to financial outcomes to ensure the cost of their debt. 
On the other hand, and consistent to findings in Alsos et. al (2006) and Coleman (2007), 
these results could show that women are more likely to use financial capital for 
purposes more aligned to objectives other than financial performance (for instance, 
survival). Given these results, we confirm our hypotheses H2 and H2b, which proposed 
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that financial resources positively impact performance, and that this effect is greater for 
MCBs, respectively. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to examine how start-up conditions such as initial size 
and financial capital affect the business performance among women- and men-
controlled firm. Firms were defined as women and men-controlled, considering the sex 
of their executive managers. In assessing performance, this study simultaneously 
considers firms’ growth in terms of sales and employment (desirable outcomes of 
entrepreneurial firms) as well as their profitability (as source of future investments and 
therefore, of business growth). 
 
This study improves upon previous research on the performance of WCBs in several 
ways. First, while much of the previous research on the performance of WCBs has been 
based on limited samples, usually from retail and service industries, and has been cross-
sectional, this study employs a large data set of 4,450 Spanish firms from twelve 
manufacturing industries and examines their performance during up to five consecutive 
years after their birth. Second, this study provides empirical evidence for firms created 
in several manufacturing industries for which the existing evidence is scarce. Most 
previous studies are focused on retail and service firms, reflecting researchers’ 
acknowledgement of women’s overrepresentation in these industries (considered as 
female-typed industries). Yet, as argued previously within this paper, not all women 
start-up businesses in retail and service and recent empirical evidence indicate a 
tendency of increased implication of women in male-typed industries such as 
manufacturing, construction and high tech. Hence, performance comparisons of WCBs 
and MCBs in such economic sectors are relevant for a full understanding of the factors 
that might enhance or impede business survival and growth of WCBs. 
 
This study tested two sets of hypotheses regarding some initial conditions that can affect 
WCBs’ performance immediately after start-up. The first set of hypotheses suggested a 
positive relationship between initial size and business performance, but a weaker 
relationship in the case of WCBs. The empirical evidence previously presented in this 
study provides only partial support to this first set of hypothesis. For all firms in the 
 23 
sample performance is negatively affected by business size. These results resemble 
those obtained in previous research on small business growth that shows growth rates 
are negatively related with the size and the age of the firms (e.g. Mata, 1994 and Hart 
and Oulton, 1996) and could indicate that small firms grow faster in order to ensure 
their survival (Audretsch, 1991 and Correa Rodriguez et al., 2003). 
 
In addition, this study’s findings indicate different shapes of the relationship between 
WCBs and MCBs. The relationship has a U-Shape for MCBs, that is men-controlled 
businesses grow initially at a decreasing rate but, when they expand beyond a certain 
threshold, their growth rates increase with size. As opposed to MCBs, the relationship 
between business size and growth is negative indicating that WCBs grow experience 
lower growth rates than MCBs. One possible explanation comes from results reported in 
previous research according to which gender differences exist among women and men 
entrepreneurs regarding the ideal-sized firm they desire (Cliff, 1998).  
  
The second set of the hypotheses tested in this study concerned the impact of finance 
(measured through initial long-term debt and annual financial costs) on business growth 
and profitability and suggest that while financial capital has a positive impact on 
subsequent business performance, this effect is weaker in the case of WCBs. Results in 
this case indicate that both the amount of long-term debt and the annual amount of 
interests paid for the long-term debt (financial costs) enhance business growth for both 
WCBs and MCBs. However when firm profitability is employed and performance is 
measured controlling for risk, financial costs appear as boosting the performance of 
MCBs This result could reflect that, on the hand, male managers have a greater 
incentive to financial outcomes to ensure the cost of their debt. On the other hand, 
consistent to findings in Alsos et. al (2006) and Coleman (2007), this results could show 
that women are more likely to use financial capital to purposes more aligned to firm 
survival rather than financial performance. 
 
The study, however, is subject to a number of limitations which give place to future 
improvements and extensions. First, departing from the assumption that eventual 
differences between WCBs and MCBs’ economic performance is rather a result of 
differences in starting conditions (Carter and Shaw, 2006) this study only considered the 
impact of initial firm features such as business size at start-up and initial debt of the 
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economic performance of firms in the sample. However, initial start-up conditions are 
not limited to firm specific features but also extend to issues like human capital 
(attributes, skills, education and experience); social capital (relationships and networks) 
or organizational capital (organizational relationships, structures, routines, culture and 
knowledge) (Firkin, 2003). As indicated in Cooper et. al (1994) such non-financial 
capital influence firm performance as entrepreneurs’ formal education, previous 
experience and access to general networks influence their decision-making processes 
and the extent to which they perceive and exploit business opportunities.  
 
Although research on human and social capital in women-controlled business is at an 
early stage (Carter and Shaw, 2006), some studies indicate that WCBs and MCBs differ 
with respect to the amount and quality of this non-financial capital they posses (Boden 
and Nucci, 2000). This suggests that, at least partly, some of WCBs’ underperformance 
could be explained by variations in non-financial capital with respect to MCBs. 
Unfortunately, this study did not had access to data reflecting non-financial resources 
employed at start-up. Further research however, should consider WCBs’ performance 
taking into account a wider palette of factors reflecting firm’s entrepreneurial capital.  
 
A second set of limitations stems from the measurement of business outcome within this 
study. Performance was measured through traditional indicators usually employed by 
entrepreneurship research such as sales, employment and profitability and therefore 
only the pecuniary component of output was considered. Whereas growth and 
profitability can be crucial ingredients for business success, they might not be the only 
outcomes pursued by entrepreneurs. Furthermore, as indicated in Brush and Hisrich 
(2000), for comparisons between WCBs and MCBs performance should be considered 
in broader terms than pure economic performance and it should also refer to outcomes 
other than financial measures such as personal economic performance (the 
entrepreneur’s salary) and social performance (employee satisfaction, social 
contributions), goal achievement and effectiveness. The consideration by future 
research, of such complementary measures of business performance could therefore 
better identify and explain the factors underlying WCBs survival and growth. 
 
Finally, we should also note that this study focused on the performance immediately 
after start-up and for some of the firms included in the sample the available information 
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was limited to the first two years of firms’ life. However, even for the case of those 
firms founded in 2000, the information used to assess firm performance is limited to the 
first five years after start-up. Two to five years can be a too short period for firms to 
demonstrate their possibilities, especially in the case of high-tech firms (Cooper et. al, 
1994) for which a longer period is required to catch-up the skills and competitive 
capabilities required for business success. Therefore, longitudinal information 
comprising more than five years could be of more use to disentangle the factors 
underlying business performance of WCBs in male-typed industries. 
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Table 1a. Empirical research on the effect of start-up conditions on the performance of women-controlled businesses 
Author(s)/ 
Sample 
Evidence of  
WCBs 
under - 
performance 
Initial resources considered Performance measures Summary of results 
Cooper et al. (1994) 
1053 newly created US 
firms (385 failed and 668 
surviving firms 
YES 
1) human capital 
- entrepreneur’s level of education 
- management know-how 
- industry know-how 
2) financial capital 
- total amount of capital invested by the 
time of first sale 
Probabilities for: 
Business failure 
Survival with some growth 
Growth (in employees): 
Firms with growth levels of 
at least 50% and which 
added at least two new 
employees 
A strong positive relationship was found between the 
human and financial capital employed at start-up and 
firms’ probability of survival and growth. Factors as 
venture size, financial capital base or lack of prior 
experience in business organizations were found as 
working “to the disadvantage of female and minority 
entrepreneurs”. Results indicate that although WCBs 
were just as likely to survive as MCBs, they were 
less likely to grow. 
Carter et al (1997) 
203 (59 WCBs) US firms 
in the retail industry 
YES 
1) tangible resources  
- business size at start-up 
- access to financial capital  
2) intangible resources 
- the level of prior experience in 
launching new venture 
- the extent to which business founders 
have experience working in the same 
industry as that of the new venture 
3) strategy 
Business failure 
WCBs show higher odds of discontinuing than MCBs 
and that the lack of initial human and financial 
resources significantly increases the odds of business 
discontinuance. Data analysis also indicates certain 
resource deficiency for WCBs (men were found as 
having more industry experience and they started the 
businesses at a larger scale). However, this resource 
deficiency did not appeared to differentially affect 
the survival of WCBs relative with MCBs. Regarding 
the effect of strategy upon business survival the 
results indicate that, through strategic choice WCBs 
can decrease their odds of discontinuance, that is 
strategy was found as being more important for the 
success of WCBs. 
Bodden and Nucci (2000) 
2256 male and 2625 white 
non-hispanic sole 
proprietors in the retail 
trade and service 
industries that have started 
their businesses in 1980 
and 1985 
YES 
Owner attributes: marital status; 
education; prior paid employment 
experience; age; howers worked per 
week in business 
Business attributes: start-up or buy-
out; home based business; capital used 
at start-up; years of ownership tenure; 
industry. 
Business survival: 
dichotomous variables (1 if 
owners claim they still own 
their business and 0 otherwise) 
Education and prior experience in employment 
enhance the survival prospects of both WCBs and 
MCBs.  Women were found as using much less 
financial capital to start or acquire their businesses. 
However, a positive relationship between survival 
prospects and initial capitalization has been 
established partially, only for businesses which 
started in 1980. 
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Table 1a (continued). Empirical research on the effect of start-up conditions on the performance  
of women-controlled businesses 
Author(s)/ 
Sample 
Evidence of  
WCBs 
under - 
performance 
Initial resources considered Performance measures Summary of results 
Bosma et al. (2004) 
Over 1100 Dutch 
entrepreneurs (number of 
women not specified) 
YES 
1) human capital 
- experience in business ownership 
- experience in activities relevant to 
business ownership 
- industry experience 
2) social capital 
-contact with entrepreneurs in networks 
-ways of information gathering 
- emotional support from spouse 
- presence of spouse 
3) financial capital 
- other income available 
- experienced problems getting started 
Survival 
Profit 
Employment 
Male business founders outperformed women on all 
performance measures. 
Results indicate that specific investments of firm 
founders in human or social capital enhance business 
performance. In addition, initial capital constraints 
have a negative impact on survival time and 
earnings. The study does not indicate if these 
resources influence differently the performance of  
WCBs and MCBs. 
Alsos et al. (2004) 
360 newly founded 
Norwegian firms (21.9% 
WCBs) 
YES 
Financial capital: the amount of 
capital invested at start-up 
(debt+equity) 
 
Early sales growth 
(19 months after start-up) 
The results indicate that WCBs grow less than MCBs, 
and that there is funding gap between men and 
women entrepreneurs at start-up, with women raising 
smaller amounts of capital. In addition the amount of 
capital obtained at start-up was found to be strongly 
associated with sales turnover 19 months later. 
However, after controlling for the amount of 
financial capital invested in the new ventures, no 
statistical significant difference was found between 
WCBs and MCBs with respect to the early growth in 
terms of sales turnover. 
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Table 1b. Empirical research on the performance of women-controlled businesses at post start-up moments 
Author(s)/Sample 
Evidence 
of WCBs 
under- 
performance 
Performance measures Summary of results 
Rosa et al. (1996) 
600 (300 women) UK small 
business owners in textile and 
clothing, business services and 
hotel and catering industries  
YES 
Primary measures: 
Number of employees 
Growth in employees 
Sales turnover 
Value of capital assets 
 
MCBs outperformed for each of the primary performance measure. Women 
employed less core staff and they show less growth in employment. MCBs have 
higher sales turnover and more physical assets. After controlling for a series of 
demographic factors, sex still appears as a significant determinant of 
performance differences. 
Chell and Baines (1998) 
104 microbusinesses in the UK 
business services sector 40 MCBs, 
39 WCBs and 25 mixed 
NO 
Business turnover 
Growth orientation: composite 
measure based on changes in 
number of employees, business 
turnover and floor space 
After controlling for industry and size, no significant differences in business 
turnover or growth orientation were found. Women were found to be just as 
likely to keep their business and domestic lives separate as they were to want to 
integrate business and family. 
Fasci and Valdez (1998) 
604 (682 women) US owners of 
small accounting practices 
YES 
Ratio of annual net profit to annual 
gross revenue of the firm 
Data showed a difference of +6% in the profit ratio of WCBs. When controlled 
for a series of business and personal characteristics, MCBs are expected a higher 
ratio of profits to gross revenue. Businesses established to attain flexibility and 
home-based businesses had significantly lower profit ratios (95% of women 
established their practices to attain flexibility). Business size and age and work 
experience of the owner were found as strongly related to the profit ratio of the 
business. 
DuRietz and Henrekson (2000) 
4200 Swedish firms (10% WCBs) 
from multiple sectors 
PARTIAL 
Self-reported variables of growth in: 
Sales  
Profitability 
Employment 
Orders 
WCBs underperformed when data was examined at the most aggregate level. 
After controlling for a series of business and industry characteristics, MCBs 
outperformed only with respect to sales growth. 
Robb (2002) 
Nearly 45000 firms (30642 
WCBs) from a wide range of 
sectors 
YES 
Business survival 
(conditional probability that the 
business closes at one moment, given 
that it has survived up until that 
moment) 
Smaller firms and single unit firms were more likely to close than larger and 
multiple units firms, respectively. After controlling for firm size, industry, legal 
and organizational form and location, there were significant differences in the 
survival prospects of businesses by owner race and gender. Women-owned 
businesses were 5% more likely to close than businesses owned by men. 
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Table 1b(continued). Empirical research on the performance of women-controlled businesses at post start-up moments 
Author(s)/Sample 
Evidence 
of WCBs 
under- 
performance 
Performance measures Summary of results 
Watson (2001) 
14426 Australian SMEs (875 
WCBs) from a wide range of 
sectors 
YES 
Total income 
Profit /Loss 
Finds significant demographic differences which are also associated with the 
under-performance of WCBs. After controlling for these demographic factors, 
WCBs still under-perform MCBs. 
Watson (2002) 
14426 Australian SMEs (875 
WCBs) from a wide range of 
sectors 
PARTIAL 
Return on assets (ROA) 
Return on equity (ROE) 
Ratio of total income to total assets 
Although MCBs generate more outputs and uses higher levels of inputs profitable 
WCBs outperformed profitable MCBs whereas no significant differences were 
found for unprofitable firms. 
For profitable firms, all the independent variables were significant in explaining 
differences in ROA whereas for ROE the number of days the business operated 
was not significant. 
Watson (2003) 
4939  Australian SMEs  from a wide 
range of sectors (331 WCBs) 
PARTIAL 
Discontinuance of business 
(failure rates) 
Prior to controlling for industry effects the failure rates of WCBs appeared to be 
higher than for MCBs. However, after controlling for industry, no significant 
differences were found in failure rates of WCBs as compared to MCBs. 
WCBs show higher failure rates in industries where they are overrepresented 
(i.e., retail trade and service) as compared to industries where MCBs are 
overrepresented (i.e. manufacturing, constructions, mining and wholesale trade). 
Watson and Robinson (2003) 
2367 (131 WCBs) Australian 
SMEs from a wide range of 
sectors 
NO 
Reward - to - variability ratio based 
on average annual profit – as reward 
measure – and standard deviation in 
profits as variability (risk) measure. 
WCBs have significantly lower profits and less variation in profits. However, 
after controlling for risk, no significant difference in the performance was found. 
Collins-Dodd et al (2004) 
160 (86 women) Canadian owners 
of small accounting practices 
PARTIAL 
Gross revenue 
Net profit 
Satisfaction with: 
   Gross revenue 
   Net profit 
   Growth 
Significant differences were found for quantitative measures of performance 
(gross revenue and net profit). No significant differences were found in the 
satisfaction with practice’s performance. After controlling for personal and 
business characteristics, no significant differences were found. The following 
independent variables were found as significant in explaining financial 
performance: number of employees, location of the business, years in practice, 
education, number of dependent children and the desire to make more money. 
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Table 1b(continued). Empirical research on the performance of women-controlled businesses at post start-up moments 
Author(s)/Sample 
Evidence of 
WCBs 
under- 
performance 
Performance measures Summary of results 
Johnsen and McMahon (2005) 
Longitudinal data Australian 
SMEs from a wide range of 
sectors: 
1996: 2102 (177 WCBs) 
1997: 2087 (164 WCBs) 
1998: 2082 (192 WCBs) 
NO 
Financial performance: 
Return on owner’s equity 
Return on total assets 
Business growth: 
Growth in employees 
Growth in sales 
   Growth in assets 
The sex of the owner – manager did not emerge as statistically significant neither 
for the differences in the financial performance nor for those in the growth of the 
businesses, in any model or year. 
Cron et al (2006) 
572 owners (178 women) of small 
veterinarian practices in US 
YES Personal income of the entrepreneur 
Owner income was significantly lower for women Male service providers started 
their practice to make a financial success. While female owners are found to 
work the same number of hours as male owners, they have less experience, 
operate fewer locations and work with more associates. 
Coleman (2007) 
2795 US firms (of which 605 
WCBs) owned by white women 
and men in service and retail 
industries 
NO 
Return on sales 
Sales growth 
WCBs in the sample appeared as more profitable and demonstrated a 
significantly higher year to year growth in sales. For WCBs the measures of 
human capital had a higher impact on profitability, whereas the measures of 
financial capital had a higher impact on the performance of MCBs. 
Boohene et al (2008) 
600 general merchants in the 
retail industry in Ghana (296 
women) 
YES 
Self reported measures of business 
success  
 The study found gender differences in entrepreneurs' personal values, which 
lead to different business strategies adopted by women and men, which in turn 
affect performance. However, the results indicate a weak direct influence of 
gender on performance. 
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Table 2. Industry Configuration of the sample 
Industry sectors 
Degree of 
technological 
implementation
§
 
% Women 
controlled 
firms 
% Men 
controlled 
firms 
% 
Overall 
Production, processing and 
preserving of meat and meat 
products (151) 
Low 7.92 
**
 6.59 6.76 
Processing and preserving of 
fish and fish products (152) 
Low 1.77 
**
 1.16 1.23 
Processing and preserving of 
fruit and vegetables (153) 
Low  4.44 
***
 3.03 3.20 
Manufacture of vegetable and 
animal oils and fats (154) 
Low 1.16 
*
 1.64 1.58 
Manufacture of dairy products 
(155) 
Low   3.23 
***
 1.94 2.10 
Manufacture of 
pharmaceuticals, medicinal 
chemicals and botanical 
products (244) 
High  0.76 
**
 1.26 1.20 
Manufacture of basic metals 
(27) 
Medium 8.93 9.82 9.71 
Manufacture of structural metal 
products (281) 
Medium   40.36 
***
 45.88 45.19 
Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment (29) 
Medium 14.63 14.44 14.46 
Manufacture of office 
machinery and computers (30) 
High 1.26 1.70 1.64 
Manufacture of electrical 
machinery and apparatus (31) 
Medium   13.32 
***
 9.73 10.10 
Manufacture of radio, television 
and communication equipment 
and apparatus (32) 
High 2.22 2.80 2.73 
High-technology implementation   4.24 
***
 5.72 5.54 
Medium-technology implementation 77.25 
**
 79.92 79.58 
Low-technology implementation  18.52 
***
 14.36 14.88 §
 According to OECD’s classification. Total number of observations: 15,826 corresponding to time period 
2000–2005. Standard deviation is presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at  the 0.10, 0.05 
and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 3. Characteristics of Start-ups by starting year (mean values) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Firms 914 404 1,091 1,033 1,008 
  WCB 104 40 124 132 133 
  MCB 813 365 968 905 875 
      
Initial total 
assets  
728.64 1,041.51 618.84 404.52 350.72 
  WCB 242.03 
***
 1,680.94 310.12 
**
 243.54 
**
 235.29 
**
 
  MCB 742.05 1,009.22 690.47 439.35 368.19 
      
Initial 
employees  
7.28 10.92 5.52 5.11 5.38 
  WCB 6.27 15.95 4.39 4.26 5.57 
  MCB 7.42 10.50 5.68 5.35 5.34 
      
Initial debt 
(long term) 
154.48 129.50 188.10 148.63 63.29 
  WCB 70.05 
*
 28.90 
**
 36.51 
**
 33.38 
*
 46.57 
  MCB 165.39 148.73 222.14 173.08 67.67 
      
Initial 
financial cost 
10.36 9.42 11.24 4.01 3.44 
  WCB 2.95 
**
 7.54 
*
 2.95 
**
 1.95 
***
 2.77 
  MCB 11.40 10.17 13.08 4.37 3.54 
Firms are considered as woman-controlled if a woman serves as CEO. Financial cost is measured through 
the interest paid for long term debt. Total number of firms 4,450: 533 WCB: 533 firms and 1,982 
observations. MCB: 3,917 firms and 13,844 observations. Monetary values are expressed in thousand of 
euros. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 4. Performance measures – mean values (Firms born between 2000 – 2004) 
 
Women 
controlled 
firms 
N 
Men 
controlled 
firms 
N Overall N 
Performance        
Sharpe Ratio 
0.0349 
**
 
(0.6819) 
1,268 
0.0838 
(1.1693) 
9,091 
0.0778 
(1.1211) 
10,359 
Sales growth 
0.3970 
**
 
(0.8710) 
1,175 
0.4520 
(0.8634) 
8,371 
0.4452 
(0.8645) 
9,546 
Labour growth 
0.1925 
(0.5603) 
983 
0.2124 
(0.5680) 
6,883 
0.2099 
(0.5670) 
7,866 
N refers to the number of observations for the corresponding variable and category. The number of 
observations changes due to the presence of some missing values. Standard deviation is presented in 
brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Sharpe 
Ratio is defined as the ratio of a profit measure (reward) divided by the standard deviation observed for 
those profits (variability). Sales and labour growth measures were computed as yearly variations in sales 
and in the number of employees, respectively. 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics. Mean values for 2000 – 2005 
(Firms born between 2000 – 2004) 
 
Women 
controlled 
firms 
N 
Men 
controlled 
firms 
N Overall N 
Performance        
Sales growth 
0.3970 
**
 
(0.8710) 
1,175 
0.4520 
(0.8634) 
8,371 
0.4452 
(0.8645) 
9,546 
Labour growth 
0.1925 
(0.5603) 
983 
0.2124 
(0.5680) 
6,883 
0.2099 
(0.5670) 
7,866 
Sharpe’s Ratio 
0.0349 
**
 
(0.6819) 
1,268 
0.0838 
(1.1693) 
9,091 
0.0778 
(1.1211) 
10,359 
Firm features       
Total assets (t-1) 
556.81 
***
 
(2,631.84) 
1,303 
2,190.88 
(44,167.52) 
9,286 
1,989.80 
(41,374.40) 
10,589 
Total sales (t-1) 
770.78 
***
 
(3,473.54) 
1,198 
1,679.24 
(12,678.92) 
8,514 
1,567.18 
(11,937.33) 
9,712 
Employees (t-1) 
8.16 
***
 
(14,73) 
1,024 
11.40 
(40.98) 
7,159 
10.99 
(38.70) 
8,183 
Firm age (years) 
3.23 
(1.24) 
1,449 
3.25 
(1.24) 
10,194 
3.25 
(1.24) 
11,643 
Long term debt (t-1) 
93.46 
***
 
(297.70) 
1,168 
881.13 
(27,399.74) 
8,358 
784.56 
(25,666.38) 
9,526 
Financial costs (t-1) 
8.03 
***
 
(17.58) 
1,185 
47.65 
(1,008.45) 
8,458 
42.78 
(944.56) 
9,643 
Leverage (t-1) 
(debt / equity) 
8.62 
*
 
(37.21) 
1,289 
11.10 
(81.24) 
9,183 
10.80 
(77.19) 
10,472 
Firms are considered as woman-controlled if a woman serves as CEO. Monetary values are expressed in 
thousand of euros. N refers to the number of observations for the corresponding variable and category. 
The number of observations changes due to the presence of some missing values. Standard deviation is 
presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). 
Firm age is measured in years, financial cost is the interest paid for the contracted long-term debt, and 
leverage is calculated as the ratio of debt to equity. 
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Table 6. Regression results: Firm Sales Growth 
 Women controlled firms Men controlled firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Firm age (years) 
-0.0497 
(0.0554) 
-0.0008 
(0.0340) 
0.0005 
(0.0347) 
-0.0080 
(0.0409) 
-0.0219 
(0.0531) 
-0.0106 
(0.0611) 
Size (ln sales) (t-1)  
-0.7339 
***
 
(0.1222) 
-0.5807 
***
 
(0.1126) 
-0.7961 
***
 
(0.1274) 
-0.9752 
***
 
(0.0419) 
-0.9769 
***
 
(0.0456) 
-0.9458 
***
 
(0.0390) 
Size squared (t-1) 
-0.0158 
*
 
(0.0092) 
-0.0304 
***
 
(0.0110) 
-0.0148 
*
 
(0.0088) 
0.0145 
***
 
(0.0038) 
0.0144 
***
 
(0.0022) 
0.0091 
***
 
(0.0035) 
Leverage (t-1) 
0.0006 
(0.0004) 
  
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
  
Long term debt (t-1)  
0.0438 
***
 
(0.0123) 
  
0.0389 
***
 
(0.0069) 
 
Financial cost (t-1)   
0.2267 
***
 
(0.0517) 
  
0.1924 
***
 
(0.0167) 
Time (dummies) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time×Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 
5.2296 
***
 
(0.3282) 
4.5450 
***
 
(0.2770) 
4.9435 
***
 
(0.2908) 
5.6394 
***
 
(0.2538) 
5.6074 
***
 
(0.3080) 
5.3698 
***
 
(0.3284) 
R-square (within) 0.7848 0.8004 0.8052 0.7497 0.7536 0.7757 
R-square (overall) 0.2539 0.2534 0.3232 0.2374 0.2509 0.3090 
F – Test 46.91 
***
 45.39 
***
 50.91 
***
 293.34 
***
 271.83 
***
 324.57 
***
 
Hausman test 697 
***
 678 
***
 517 
***
 4,812 
***
 3,739 
***
 3,668 
***
 
Number of firms 471 461 460 3,231 3,156 3,154 
Number of 
observations 
1,164 1,077 1,126 8,277 7,740 7,992 
Firms are considered as woman-controlled if a woman serves as CEO. Firm age is measured in years, 
firm size is the log value of sales, leverage is calculated as the ratio of debt to equity, and financial cost is 
the interest paid for the contracted long-term debt. Standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity are 
presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
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Table 7. Regression results: Firm Employment Growth 
 Women controlled firms Men controlled firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Firm age (years) 
-0.1844 
**
 
(0.0805) 
-0.1823 
**
 
(0.0842) 
-0.1776 
**
 
(0.0740) 
0.0190 
(0.0542) 
-0.0232 
(0.0559) 
-0.0145 
(0.0551) 
Size (ln labour) (t-1)  
-0.7235 
***
 
(0.0891) 
-0.6660 
***
 
(0.0789) 
-0.7844 
***
 
(0.0782) 
-0.9243 
***
 
(0.0479) 
-0.9402 
***
 
(0.0440) 
-0.9401 
***
 
(0.0485) 
Size squared (t-1) 
-0.0357 
*
 
(0.0214) 
-0.0510 
**
 
(0.0242) 
-0.0296 
**
 
(0.0152) 
0.0140 
**
 
(0.0069) 
0.0238 
**
 
(0.0121) 
0.0161 
**
 
(0.0089) 
Leverage (t-1) 
0.0008 
(0.0006) 
  
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
  
Long term debt (t-1)  
0.0382 
***
 
(0.0135) 
  
0.0422 
***
 
(0.0065) 
 
Financial cost (t-1)   
0.1612 
***
 
(0.0275) 
  
0.1251 
***
 
(0.0140) 
Time (dummies) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time×Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 
2.3121 
***
 
(0.3645) 
2.1553 
***
 
(0.3807) 
2.1358 
***
 
(0.3364) 
1.6479 
***
 
(0.2490) 
1.6946 
***
 
(0.2561) 
1.6115 
***
 
(0.2521) 
R-square (within) 0.7279 0.7330 0.7458 0.6050 0.5983 0.6117 
R-square (overall) 0.1484 0.1529 0.1979 0.0954 0.1115 0.1352 
F – Test 28.11 
***
 25.97 
***
 31.82 
***
 118.20 
***
 104.73 
***
 116.59 
***
 
Hausman test 510 
***
 450 
***
 557 
***
 3,617 
***
 2,769 
***
 2,741 
***
 
Number of firms 409 400 399 2,830 2,757 2,753 
Number of 
observations 
973 902 944 6,817 6,394 6,579 
Firms are considered as woman-controlled if a woman serves as CEO. Firm age is measured in years, 
firm size is the log value of number of employees, leverage is calculated as the ratio of debt to equity, and 
financial cost is the interest paid for the contracted long-term debt. Standard errors adjusted by 
heteroskedasticity are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, 
respectively. 
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Table 8. Regression results: Sharpe ratio 
 Women controlled firms Men controlled firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Firm age (years) 
-0.3631 
***
 
(0.0422) 
0.4004 
***
 
(0.0049) 
-0.3460 
***
 
(0.0410) 
0.2152 
***
 
(0.0785) 
0.1987 
**
 
(0.0795) 
0.2029 
**
 
(0.0832) 
Size (ln assets) (t-1)  
-0.3710 
(0.2453) 
-0.3292 
(0.2567) 
-0.4148 
(0.2902) 
-0.2115 
**
 
(0.1209) 
-0.1998 
**
 
(0.1013) 
-0.2089 
**
 
(0.1060) 
Size squared (t-1)  
0.0339 
(0.0248) 
0.0262 
(0.0251) 
0.0294 
(0.0279) 
0.0351 
***
 
(0.0176) 
0.0338 
**
 
(0.0170) 
0.0323 
**
 
(0.0162) 
Leverage (t-1) 
-0.0056 
**
 
(0.0025) 
  
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
  
Long term debt (t-1)  
0.0622 
(0.0420) 
  
0.0145 
(0.0178) 
 
Financial cost (t-1)   
0.0947 
(0.0856) 
  
0.0972 
***
 
(0.0381) 
Time (dummies) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time×Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 
-1.0430 
*
 
(0.6352) 
-4.6907 
***
 
(0.6781) 
-0.8830 
(0.7598) 
-4.3088 
***
 
(0.5065) 
-4.3039 
***
 
(0.5153) 
-4.3385 
***
 
(0.5190) 
R-square (within) 0.3571 0.3537 0.3420 0.2649 0.2653 0.2717 
R-square (overall) 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.1120 0.1151 0.1210 
F – Test 5.28 
***
 4.55 
***
 4.67 
***
 24.85 
***
 22.52 
***
 24.86 
***
 
Hausman test 530 
***
 211 
***
 483 
***
 1,934 
***
 1,776 
***
 1,862 
***
 
Number of firms 405 391 398 2,747 2,671 2,685 
Number of 
observations 
867 801 847 6,314 5,902 6,134 
Firms are considered as woman-controlled if a woman serves as CEO. Firm age is measured in years, 
firm size is the log value of assets, leverage is calculated as the ratio of debt to equity, and financial cost 
is the interest paid for the contracted long-term debt. Standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity are 
presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Mean interest rate 
(a) 
applied to women and men controlled businesses 
Year Women controlled firms Men controlled firms Full sample 
2001 0.0155 (0.0235) 0.0180 (0.0372) 0.0173 (0.0348) 
2002 0.0286 (0.0306) 0.0268 (0.0328) 0.0271 (0.0323) 
2003 0.0320 (0.0841) 0.0252 (0.0357) 0.0258 (0.0434) 
2004 0.0285 (0.0556) 0.0258 (0.0511) 0.0260 (0.0508) 
2005 0.0248 (0.0337) 0.0268 (0.1396) 0.0264 (0.1284) 
Overall 0.0270 (0.0518) 0.0257 (0.0920) 0.0258 (0.0857) 
Note: (a) Mean interest rate is calculated as financial cost divided to debt. Standard deviation is presented 
in brackets. No statistically significant differences were found between mean interest rates of women and 
men controlled businesses.  
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Table 10. Results for the Chow Test: Differences in the impact of size and initial 
financial conditions between WCB and MCB firms 
 
 Size (t-1) 
Size squared 
(t-1) 
Leverage 
Long-term 
debt 
Financial 
cost 
Panel A: Sales Growth      
   Model 1 (Leverage) 5.06 
**
 7.66 
***
 2.14   
   Model 2 (Long-term debt) 11.54 
***
 14.19 
***
  0.18  
   Model 3 (Financial cost) 2.21 
*
 5.37 
**
   0.02 
      
Panel B: Employment 
Growth 
     
   Model 1 (Leverage) 2.86 
*
 3.28 
*
 1.91   
   Model 2 (Long-term debt) 7.66 
***
 6.84 
***
  1.10  
   Model 3 (Financial cost) 2.39 
*
 2.72 
*
   1.29 
      
Panel C: Sharpe ratio      
   Model 1 (Leverage) 0.02 0.18 5.64 
**
   
   Model 2 (Long-term debt) 0.00 0.50  0.87  
   Model 3 (Financial cost) 0.01 0.28   2.23 
*
 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
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